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Allocation of course seats to students is a challenging task for registrars￿ oﬃces in universities.
Since demand exceeds supply for many courses, course allocation needs to be done equitably
and eﬃciently. Many schools use bidding systems where student bids are used both to infer
preferences over courses and to determine student priorities for courses. However, this dual role
of bids can result in course allocations not being market outcomes and unnecessary eﬃciency loss,
which can potentially be avoided with the use of an appropriate market mechanism. We report
a ￿eld experiment done at the University of Michigan Business School in Spring 2004 comparing
its typical course bidding mechanism with the alternate Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market
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1mechanism. Our results suggest that using the latter could vastly improve eﬃciency of course
allocation systems while facilitating market outcomes.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Registrars￿ oﬃces at most universities face the daunting task of allocating course seats to students.
Since the learning experience of students is a direct function of the courses they take, and demand
for many courses often exceeds supply, it is important that courses are allocated equitably and
eﬃciently across students. While many schools use preference revelation (preference ranking)
mechanisms to allocate courses (e.g., Stanford Business School, Harvard Business School), others
use bidding mechanisms for the same purpose (e.g., Columbia Business School, Yale School of
Management). Several schools have recently moved from preference revelation mechanisms to
bidding mechanisms (e.g., the University of Michiga n ,R o s sS c h o o lo fB u s i n e s s, henceforth referred
to as UMBS), considering the latter superior in terms of eﬃciency. However, under the bidding
mechanisms, bids are not only used to infer student preferences but also to determine student
priorities for courses. This dual role of bids results in the schools￿ course allocations not being
market outcomes, that is, the announced ￿prices￿ for courses and the announced ￿course allocation￿
do not actually clear the market. That is, students can be better oﬀ at other schedules versus their
alotted course allocation and they can aﬀord to ￿buy￿ these schedules at the announced course
prices using their bid distribution. Typically, add-drop periods at the beginning of semesters are
supposed to correct such failures, if there are any, however these periods can be congested and
furthermore, in theory, it may not be possible to correct such a failure after it occurs. Thus,
the current bidding mechanism results in unnecessary eﬃciency loss (S￿nmez and ￿nver 2003).
Although theory predicts this eﬃciency loss, its existence and magnitude has not yet been tested.
2As such, we do not know if policy makers should spend the eﬀo r tt om o v ea w a yf r o mt h ec u r r e n t
bidding mechanisms.
We report a ￿eld experiment carried out at UMBS immediately after the bidding period for
the Spring 2004 semester. The experiment is designed to test whether typical bidding systems
(in particular the UMBS mechanism) result in eﬃciency loss in real-life applications, and if so how
much eﬃciency improvement can be obtained through a transition to a market mechanism such
as the Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market mechanism. We show that the current systems in
place can be vastly improved in terms of (Pareto) eﬃciency, making a large proportion of students
(approximately 20% in our study) better oﬀ. The key is ￿separating￿ the two roles of the bids
by simply asking students to submit their preference ranking of the courses in addition to bidding
for the courses. Our results have the potential to aﬀect the learning experience of very large
numbers of students enrolling in business schools and other institutions which use similar bidding
mechanisms for course allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ￿rst elaborate on literature background related
to this paper. Then we describe currently used course bidding mechanisms. This is followed by a
detailed description of course bidding at UMBS where we did our ￿eld study. We next describe
the alternative GS mechanism that we test, and then the results from the ￿eld study. We end with
implications and limitations of the research.
32 L i t e r a t u r eB a c k g r o u n da n dR e l a t e dR e s e a r c ho nM a t c h i n gM a r -
ket Design
This research falls into the area of market design, more speci￿cally mechanism design for real-life
￿matching problems.￿ For example, the new hospital-intern matching mechanism proposed by Roth
and Peranson (1999) was adopted in 1997 by the National Resident Matching Program, a centralized
clearinghouse for the entry-level labor market for new physicians in the United States. Roth (2002)
gives an extensive survey of ￿engineering￿ approach in mechanism design for real-life markets.
Foe example, see Abdulkadiroø glu, Pathak and Roth (2005), Abdulkadiroø glu, Pathak, Roth and
S￿nmez (2005), Niederle and Roth (2005), and Roth, S￿nmez and ￿nver (2005) for current issues
on adoption of market designs in several matching markets: New York City high school match,
Boston public school admissions, resident matching to gastroenterology specialty fellowships, and
kidney exchange for paired donations for organ transplants, respectively. Many of the designs have
been supported by experimental studies which test the predictions of the theoretical design by
emulating markets before and after the design (Kagel and Roth 2000, ￿nver 2001, Haruvy, Roth
and ￿nver 2001, Chen and S￿nmez 2002 and 2003, McKinney, Niederle and Roth 2004, and Niederle
and Roth 2004). We hope that our study which tests the S￿nmez and ￿nver (2003) theory in the
￿eld will also in￿uence policy makers to consider a new market design. Moreover, our experiment
is the ￿rst (controlled) ￿eld experiment in the matching literature.
Next, we give a brief background on theoretical matching models and some of the mechanisms
that are most related to our research. One of the most commonly used matching models is due to
Gale and Shapley (1962), known as the marriage model or two-sided matching model (see Roth and
Sotomayor 1990 for an extended survey of two-sided matching models). The two-sided matching
4problem consists of two sets of players ￿ ￿rms and workers ￿ that need to be matched with each
other using preferences of ￿rms over workers and of workers over ￿rms. The central solution concept
in this domain is stability, i.e. ￿nding matchings of ￿rms with workers, and the same workers with
the same ￿rms, so that no ￿rm-worker pair would rather be matched with each other versus their
allotted partners (and no ￿rm or worker would rather stay unmatched than be with their allotted
partner). Gale and Shapley also proposed two stable matching mechanisms in their seminal paper.
Many real-life markets have adopted mechanisms based on Gale-Shapley mechanisms: Roth and
Peranson￿s (1999) redesign for the American hospital-intern matching mechanism is a variant of
the Gale-Shapley (1962) intern-optimal stable mechanism. The previously used mechanism in the
American market and the mechanisms in some regional British hospital-intern markets are variants
of the Gale-Shapley mechanisms as well (Roth 1984 and 1991).
Our problem, allocation of course seats to students, substantially diﬀers from a two-sided match-
ing problem. This problem is a variant of the house allocation problem, in which indivisible objects
(houses) need to be assigned to agents each of whom has preferences over these objects ￿ agents
are the only players in this model, objects are not players. Random serial dictatorship is one of the
most used mechanisms for this problem, in which agents are randomly ordered in a linear order
and agents choose their favorite object among the available ones, one at a time, according to this
order. In many North American college campuses, systems variants of this mechanism are used
to allocate dormitory rooms to students (Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez 1999). Course allocations
in Stanford Graduate School of Business School and Harvard Business School are done using sys-
tems that are variants of this approach. Starting with Balinski and S￿nmez (1999), many studies
showed similarities between plausible mechanisms for the house allocation problem and plausible
mechanisms for the two-sided matching problem.
5If there is additional structure to the house allocation problem, such as priorities of agents
over the houses, then mechanisms that are invented for two-sided matching can be used for these
problems as well, whenever a normative criterion similar to ￿stability￿ needs to be respected.
The underlying idea is converting the object allocation problem to an induced two-sided matching
problem by treating the priorities of the agents as ￿the preferences of the objects over agents.￿
Balinski and S￿nmez showed that the Turkish college admissions mechanism used to place high
school students to colleges in Turkey (based on exam scores determined by a centralized college
admissions test) is equivalent to the Gale-Shapley college-optimal stable mechanism for the induced
two-sided matching problem. Similarly, Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (2003) proposed the Gale-
Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism for student admissions to K-12 schools in U.S. public
schools, where students have priorities for schools in their neighborhoods constituted by the U.S.
constitution. These priorities can be used to induce preferences of schools over students in order
to create an induced two-sided matching market; then the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable
mechanism can be used in this induced two-sided matching market to ￿nd a stable matching. A
version of this proposal was adopted by New York City high schools in 2004.1
When bidding is used as a tool in the course allocation problem with the intent of reaching
market outcomes (as done in many business schools), we can induce a two-sided matching market
using student bids for each course as induced preferences of the courses, i.e., the courses are assumed
to prefer students who bid a higher amount for them (S￿nmez and ￿nver 2003). S￿nmez and ￿nver
proposed the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism as an alternative to the current
bidding mechanisms used in many business schools. They showed that this mechanism is not only
a market mechanism but also the Pareto-dominant one among all market mechanisms, while UMBS
1Also see Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2002) on priority allocations.
6mechanism is not a market mechanism.2 In this paper, we test this extension of the Gale-Shapley
student-optimal stable mechanism (that will be referred to as Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market
mechanism or simply GS mechanism and will be explained in Section 5) in a controlled ￿eld
experiment.
Within the management sciences, studies using systematic experimental tests include Amal-
doss, Meyer, Raju and Rapaport (2000), Amaldoss and Jain (2002), Katok and Roth (2004), Ho
and Weigelt (1996 and 2004), Murnighan and Roth (1977), Rapoport, Erev and Zwick (1995),
Srivastava, Chakravarti and Rapoport (2000), and Zwick and Chen (1999).
Next, we discuss currently used bidding mechanisms.
3 Currently Used Course Bidding Mechanisms
Most business schools have historically used either bid-based or preference-based mechanisms for
allocating courses. For example, Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan (UMBS),
Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern, Johnson Graduate School of Manage-
ment at Cornell, Columbia Business School, Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, Yale School of
Management, and INSEAD rely on versions of a bidding mechanism that we refer to as the UMBS
mechanism. Some law schools too rely on bidding systems for course allocation, e.g., the School
of Law at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Harvard Business School and Stanford Graduate
School of Business rely on preference-based course allocations. Recently, there appears to be a
shift from preference-based to bid-based allocations, UMBS being an example. In this paper, we
focus on bid-based mechanisms. However, some details of the preference-based allocation systems
2It turns out that a course allocation is a market outcome (i.e., the allocation determined in a market equilibrium)
in the course bidding problem if and only if it is (pairwise) stable in the induced two-sided matching problem.
7are provided in Appendix A. Appendix A also describes some variants of the bid-based course
allocation mechanisms.
Under the UMBS bid-based mechanism, ea c hs t u d e n ti sg i v e nab i de n d o w m e n tB>0 at the
beginning of each semester. In order to keep the notation at a minimum, we assume that the bid
endowment is the same for each student. This is the case at UMBS where we conducted our ￿eld
experiment. Each student is asked to allocate her bid endowment among the courses, and once all
bids are submitted, course seats are assigned to students as follows:
1. All bids for all courses and all students are ordered in a single list from highest to smallest.
A tie-breaking lottery is used to determine the relative ordering of two bids of the same size.
Thus, if each student i,p l a c e ski bids of exactly x points, the tie-breaking lottery determines
the order of these
P
i ki bids.
2. Each bid is considered one at a time following the order in the list. When it is the turn of
bid bic of student i for course c, the bid is successful if (a) course c still has un￿lled seats,
(b) student i still has un￿lled slots in her schedule, and (c) course c does not con￿ict with any
of the courses that are assigned to student i so far. If the bid is successful, then student i is
assigned a seat at course c (i.e. the bid is honored) and the process proceeds with the next
bid in the list. Otherwise student i is declined a seat at course c and the process continues
with the next bid in the list.
3. When all bids are handled, a schedule is obtained for each student and a course allocation is
hence obtained.
Market clearing bid or price for each course is the lowest successful bid if all course seats are
allocated, and zero otherwise.
8Bids have two roles under the UMBS mechanism:
1. Bids are used to infer student preferences over the courses. Consider the following statement
from the guidelines for Allocation of Places in Oversubscribed Courses and Sections at the
School of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder:
Each student has 100 bidding points for each semester. You can put all your points in one
course, section or seminar, or you can allocate points among several. By this means, you
express the strength of your preferences.
2. Bids are also used to determine who has a bigger claim on each course seat and therefore
choice of a bid-vector is an important strategic tool.
The following statement from the Bidding Instructions of both Columbia Business School and
Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley shows that these two roles may easily con￿ict.
If you do not think a course will ￿ll up, you may bid a token point or two, saving the
rest for courses you think will be harder to get into.
What happens when bids are used for both purposes (infer preferences and determine seat
claims) is that students may bid a high number of points on more popular courses, and bid few
points on less popular courses, even if they prefer the latter courses. However, it is easy to see
that this con￿ict may result in eﬃciency loss because a student may be declined a seat at one or
more of her preferred courses, despite ￿clearing the market￿ (i.e. although her bid is high enough),
simply because she clears the market in too many other less preferred courses for which she has
submitted higher bids.
S￿nmez and ￿nver (2003) shows that eﬃciency may be lost even if the students are expected
utility maximizers, and therefore there is no reason to expect that such eﬃciency loss is a rare
9event, or a mistake. Their Example 2 about this point is reproduced in Appendix B. S￿nmez and
￿nver (2003) also describe how the above mentioned eﬃciency loss can be avoided. The key is
￿separating￿ the two roles of the bids by simply asking students to submit their preference ranking
of the courses in addition to bidding for the courses. In this way the registrar￿s oﬃce no longer
needs to ￿guess￿ what student preferences are. Once the bids and preference ranks are obtained,
the Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market mechanism,m a yb eu s e df o ri m p r o v e de ﬃciency, which
we describe in Section 5.
We next describe in detail the bidding environment at the Ross School of Business at the
University of Michigan where we conducted our ￿eld study.
4 Course Bidding at UMBS: Field Study
The question now is whether the potential eﬃciency loss under the UMBS mechanism occurs in
practice and how prevalent it is. At UMBS, prior to, and during the bidding period, students
review course descriptions and time schedules on the UMBS intranet. Professors may also make
available syllabi or additional information on the course. Once the bidding period begins, students
can visit a webpage within the UMBS intranet which lists all courses available to them. The
webpage also contains information on the bidding system, timetables, ￿Tips & Tricks,￿ rules and
regulations, etc. In addition, it has information on previous market clearing prices for all the
courses.
Each student is allocated 1000 bid points for the semester. On the webpage, each course has
a place to enter a bid value. As a student bids on a course from her allocated 1000 bid points,
the bid amount is deducted from the 1000 allocated points and the balance is shown. Once 1000
points have been allocated, the student is prevented from entering any more bids. Students can
10adjust these bids as they wish (by deducting from one, then adding to another), until the bidding
period closes.
We got permission from UMBS to collect rank data from students in addition to the bid data.
So as not to contaminate the bidding process in place, we collected rank data after bidding was
over but before course allocations were made. This was a (very short) one week window of time.
4.1 Students and Courses
We have a sample of nI = 535 students who bid for nC = 135 classes scheduled for Spring 2004
semester. Let I = {i1,i 2,...,i 535} be the set of students and C = {c1,c 2,...,c 135} be the set of
classes. Each class is either the sole section of a course or one of the multiple sections of a course.
Therefore, we will refer to each class as a section. At UMBS, there are two mini-semesters in
each semester. Each mini-semester lasts about 7 weeks, and the semester lasts about 14 weeks.
Sections can be scheduled for the whole semester, for the ￿rst mini-semester, or for the second mini-
semester. Our section sample consists of 57 ￿rst mini-semester sections, 47 second mini-semester
sections, and 31 full semester sections. Each mini-semester-long section is worth 1.5 credits and
each full semester-long section is worth 3 credits.
4.2 Feasibility Conditions
In the context of course-bidding, there are feasibility conditions on individual schedules as well as
feasibility conditions on the course allocation. While a student can bid for as many sections as she
wishes, she can be registered in
1. no more than 9 credits (or an equivalent of 6 mini-semester-long sections) for the ￿rst mini-
semester,
112. no more than 9 credits (or an equivalent of 6 mini-semester-long sections) for the second
mini-semester, and
3. no more than 16.5 credits (or an equivalent of 11 mini-semester-long sections) for the whole
semester.3
An additional feasibility constraint on individual schedules rules out any con￿ict within a sched-
ule. Two sections con￿ict if either they are both sections of the same course or their weekly meeting
times overlap. While a student can bid for two con￿icting sections, she cannot be registered in
both of them. In our sample, 497 pairs of sections con￿ict out of 9045 section pairs. We refer to
any set of sections that satisfy these feasibility constraints as a schedule.
The last feasibility condition pertains not to individual schedules, but concerns the course
allocation. E a c hs e c t i o nh a sacapacity which is a cap on the number of students who can be
registered in the section. Let q =( qc)c∈C denote the capacity vector of the sections. In our
sample, the smallest capacity is 5 and the largest capacity is 430. The most common capacities are
65 and 30, applying to 58 sections and 20 sections respectively. In our sample, 35 courses received
more bids than their capacities.
4.3 Bids
As we already indicated, each student is endowed with 1000 bid points that she can use to bid across
desired sections. Bid points cannot be transferred between semesters and bids should be integer
values. A student should bid at least 1 point in order to be registered in a section. Students can
bid for as many sections as they wish including con￿icting sections. Let B =[ bic]i∈I,c∈C denote the
3When a student registers for a full semester section, she ￿consumes￿ 1.5 credits from the ￿rst mini-semester and
1.5 credits from the second mini-semester.
12bid matrix. Here, bic is the submitted bid of student i for section c, and bic =0if student i did not
bid for section c. There are 5665 positive bids in our sample. Many students submitted the same
magnitude of bid for multiple sections. Similarly, many sections received the same magnitude of
bid from multiple students. We ￿nd the most repeated bid to be ￿1￿, followed by ￿100￿, ￿2￿, ￿50￿,
￿150￿, ￿200￿, ￿5￿, ￿10￿, ￿13￿, and ￿20￿. The top-10 bids are used a total of 2135 times. A strict
bid ordering is needed to implement the UMBS mechanism and the administrators at UMBS rely
on a tie-breaking lottery for this purpose. A random real number φic ∈ (0,1) is drawn from the
uniform distribution for each student-section pair (i,c), and each positive bid bic > 0 is modi￿ed
as b0
ic = bic + φic in order to break ties. Let b0
ic = bic whenever bic =0and let B0 =[ b0
ic]i∈I,c∈C be
the modi￿ed bid matrix. The administrators at UMBS provided us with their tie-breaking lottery
draw for Spring 2004.
4.4 Preferences over Sections
We surveyed students to learn their preferences over sections. Within a few hours of the oﬃcial
closure of bidding, we sent each of the 535 students who had submitted bids a customized e-mail
asking each student to rank the sections she bid upon. Each e-mail contained an explanation of
our study and a list of all the sections that the student had bid upon. The sections were listed
by descending order of bid points, but the actual bid points were left oﬀ.4 Ap e r m i s s i o nf r o mt h e
Associate Dean was obtained to use his name as the sender of this e-mail in order to lend credibility
and urgency to the survey. Two reminder e-mails were sent to students within the same week (see
Appendix C for the original and subsequent e-mail messages). We received 489 responses out of a
total of 535 students. In addition to 46 missing responses, 32 students submitted preferences with
4This practice is in favor of UMBS mechanism, since non-motivated students may just give ranks 1,2,3. Bids
lining up with ranks, i.e., bid-monotonic preferences, favor the UMBS mechanism.
13indiﬀerences (although they were speci￿cally asked not to). In order to measure the eﬃciency loss
under the UMBS mechanism, we need strict preferences for all students. Using the 489 responses,
we constructed a strict preference ranking P =( Pi)i∈I for all 535 students to analyze the best case
scenario for the UMBS mechanism:
1. For each of the 32 students who indicated indiﬀerences, we broke indiﬀerences in favor of
sections for which the student had a higher bid based on the modi￿ed bid matrix B0.
2. For each of the 46 students with missing preferences, we assumed that sections with higher
bids were preferred to sections with lower bids.
Formally, for any student i with missing preferences and for any two sections c,d where
student i submitted positive bids we assumed that
cPid i fa n do n l yi f b0
ic >b 0
id.
This preference construction results in the lower bound of the eﬃciency loss under the UMBS
mechanism. That is the case because any eﬃciency loss here is an implication of students possibly
preferring sections for which they have lower bids to sections for which they have higher bids. We
say that a student i has bid-monotonic preferences if for any two sections c,d ∈ C,
cPid i fa n do n l yi f b0
ic >b 0
id.
As we have already emphasized, we assumed that each of the 46 students with missing preferences
has bid-monotonic preferences. In addition among the 489 students who responded to the survey,
82 submitted bid-monotonic preferences. A vast majority of the students, 375 of them, submitted
preferences that are not bid-monotonic, indicating the role of the strategic aspect of bidding in the
UMBS process. This suggests that the eﬃciency loss can be quite signi￿cant under the UMBS
mechanism.
144.5 Preferences over Schedules
We need a way to compare alternative course schedules for a student and determine which will be
preferable to her. We take a conservative approach here, making the safest assumption.
Given her preferences over courses Pi, a student i unambiguously prefers as c h e d u l eS to
another schedule S0 i fa n do n l yi f
1. schedule S h a sa tl e a s ta sm a n yc r e d i t sa ss c h e d u l eS0 does, and
2. each section in S \ S0 is strictly preferred to each section in S0 \ S based on the preference
ranking Pi.
Therefore, we will only conclude that a student has an improvement in her schedule if she
receives at least as many credits and also if any replacement in her schedule is a favorable one.
Clearly, we will not be able to compare many pairs of schedules and in such cases we call the welfare
comparison ambiguous.
Next we describe Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant Market Mechanism, the best market mecha-
nism for the course bidding problem.
5 The Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant Market Mechanism
The eﬃciency of course-bidding can be improved by adopting the Gale-Shapley Pareto-
dominant market mechanism. The following notation is useful to ease the description of this
mechanism:
Given a preference ranking Pi and a subset of sections D ⊆ C, construct the best schedule
B(D) as follows: Start by including the best section among sections in D based on the preference
15ranking Pi. Next, add the second best section under Pi provided that neither the credit require-
ments are violated, nor is there any con￿ict with the section that is already included. Next, add
the third best section under Pi provided that neither the credit requirements are violated nor are
there any con￿icts with one or more of the sections that are already included in B(D). Proceed
in a similar way until either the credit requirements do not allow for any addition or there are no
sections left with a positive bid. De￿ne B(∅)=∅. The best schedule is preferred to any other
schedule. Under the Pareto-dominant market mechanism, students are asked not only to submit
their bids but also their preference ranking over the courses they bid upon. Based on the student
preferences P =( Pi)i∈I, the modi￿ed bid matrix B0, and the capacity vector q =( qc)c∈C,t h e
outcome of the Pareto-dominant market mechanism (which will be referred to as GS mechanism
in short) can be obtained via the following version of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale
and Shapley 1962, Kelso and Crawford 1982):
Step 1. Each student proposes to all sections in her best schedule from the set of all sections
C. Each course c rejects all but the highest bidding qc students among those who have proposed.
Those who are not rejected are kept on hold.
In general, at
Step t. Each student proposes to all sections in her best schedule from the set of sections which
have not rejected her in earlier steps. Each course c rejects all but the highest bidding qc students
among those who have proposed. Those who are not rejected are kept on hold.
The procedure terminates when no proposal is rejected and at this stage the course assignments are
￿nalized by assigning each student the courses which keeps her on hold. The market clearing bid
or price of each course is the lowest successful bid, if all course seats are ￿lled, and zero, otherwise.
The course bidding market we consider consists of preferences of students over schedules and a
16bid matrix of students. A course allocation and a price vector pair is a market equilibrium of this
course bidding market if for each student there is no other schedule that the student prefers to her
assigned schedule where she can ￿aﬀord￿ each course in this new schedule at this price vector. The
course allocation at a market equilibrium is called a market outcome. The price vector associated
with a market outcome is a competitive price vector. As S￿nmez and ￿nver (2003) prove, (i)
GS mechanism eliminates ineﬃciencies that result from registrar￿s oﬃces using bids as a proxy of
the strength of the preferences; and (ii) GS mechanism is a market mechanism whose outcome
Pareto-dominates any other market outcome.5 As the example in Appendix B shows, the UMBS
mechanism is not a market mechanism although it is promoted as one by many business schools.
That it is promoted as a market mechanism can be inferred from the following question and its
answer borrowed from UMBS, Course Bidding Tips and Tricks:
Q .H o wd oIg e ti n t oac o u r s e ?
A. If you bid enough points to make market clear, a seat will be reserved for you in that section
of the course, up to class capacity.
We now discuss the results from the ￿eld study and see how large the loss in eﬃciency can be
from using the UMBS versus the GS mechanism.
5S￿nmez and ￿nver (2003) also prove that for existence of market equilibria, it is suﬃcient for the preferences
over schedules to satisfy substitutability (Kelso and Crawford 1982) which simply means that if two courses are both
in the best schedule from a set of available courses and if one of the courses becomes unavailable, then the other one
is still in the best schedule from the smaller set of available courses.
176 Results from the Field Study
We provide two sets of results. In the ￿rst set of results, we compare the eﬃciency of the two
mechanisms for the Spring 2004 UMBS tie-breaker lottery draw and the modi￿ed bid matrix B0.
In the second set of results we provide a robustness check with Monte Carlo simulation.
6.1 Analysis Using the UMBS Tie-Breaker Draw
Our analysis reveals that a potential transition to the GS mechanism is likely to result in signi￿cant
eﬃciency improvement.
We observe that 10 ￿rst-quarter sections, 12 second-quarter sections, and 5 full semester sections
￿lled their capacities under the GS mechanism whereas 9 ￿rst-quarter sections, 11 second-quarter
sections, and 5 full semester sections ￿lled their capacities under the UMBS mechanism.
Full Sections GS UMBS
Quarter 1 10 9
Quarter 2 12 11
Regular Semester 5 5
Table 1: Number of sections that are full under the UMBS and GS allocations using the UMBS
tie-breaker lottery draw.
Out of the 489 students who responded to the survey, 456 receive the same credit load under
both mechanisms. Among them
￿ each of 366 students is assigned the same schedule under both mechanisms,
￿ each of 83 students unambiguously prefers her schedule under the GS mechanism to her
schedule under the UMBS mechanism,
18￿ no student unambiguously prefers her schedule under the UMBS mechanism to her schedule
under the GS mechanism, and
￿ the welfare comparison is ambiguous for 7 of these students.
Out of the 489 students who responded, 21 students receive more credits under the GS mecha-
nism and
￿ each of 18 of them unambiguously prefers her schedule under the GS mechanism to her
schedule under the UMBS mechanism, whereas
￿ the welfare comparison is ambiguous for the remaining 3.
Out of the 489 students who responded, 12 students receive more credits under the UMBS
mechanism and
￿ each of 2 of them unambiguously prefers her schedule under the UMBS mechanism to her
schedule under the GS mechanism, whereas
￿ the welfare comparison is ambiguous for the remaining 10.
So altogether, 366 of the 489 students who responded are indiﬀerent between the two mecha-
nisms, 101 of them unambiguously prefer the GS mechanism, 2 of them unambiguously prefer the
UMBS mechanism, and a conclusion cannot be drawn for 20 students.
One last point deserves clari￿cation: It is clear why many students prefer the GS mechanism
to the UMBS mechanism. This is because they get the courses they really want and do not end
up with a situation where they get more popular courses that they strategically bid more on, but
like less (and get closed out of courses they like more but bid less on). What may be less clear is
19Valid Responses Indiﬀerent Prefers GS Prefers UMBS Ambiguous Total
Same Credit Load 366 83 0 7 456
More Credits under GS - 18 - 3 21
More Credits under UMBS - - 2 10 12
Total 366 101 2 20 489
Table 2: Among students who have responded, comparison of student preferences over the UMBS
and GS allocations using the UMBS tie-breaker lottery draw.
why two students prefer the UMBS mechanism to the GS mechanism. The reason is quite simple.
These two students got ￿lucky￿ under the UMBS mechanism and were assigned one or more courses
despite their relatively low bids because some other students with higher bids were denied seats
and were instead assigned seats at their less preferred courses (where they bid even higher). Since
such ￿mistakes￿ are corrected under the GS mechanism, and the courses ￿lled up, the two lucky
students suﬀer a welfare loss under the GS mechanism.
6.2 Robustness Check: Simulation for the Tie-Breaker Lottery
As we have reported earlier, the indiﬀerences are broken with a tie-breaking lottery at UMBS and
we have already reported the results for the Spring 2004 lottery draw. In the following table we
report the results of a robustness test where we draw random lotteries to break ties, and repeat
this 1000 times. The results are virtually the same as the UMBS lottery draw.
6.3 Improvement in Ranks
We also computed the improvement in mean ranks among all courses allocated by the UMBS versus
GS mechanisms for the modi￿ed bid matrix B0. In order to do this across both full semester and
mini-semester courses, all full semester courses were treated as a package of two mini-semester





































Table 3: Among students who have responded, comparison of student preferences over the UMBS
and GS allocations using the Monte-Carlo simulation. Averages and standard errors (in parentheses
below the averages) are reported for the sample.
courses with the same rank applying to both. We explain this with a simple example:
Example: Suppose a student bids for 13 sections and only 4 of these are full-semester sections,
which are the 2nd,3 rd,1 0 th and 11th choices in her preference ranking. After we convert her
preferences to their mini-semester equivalent, her preferences include 17 mini-sections. Each of the
two mini-semester equivalents for the full-semester section is given the same preference ranking.
Thus, the two mini-sections of the full-semester sections are ranked as the 2nd,4 th,1 2 th and 14th
choices, amongst the 17 choices. Now, suppose under one of the mechanisms, she gets enrolled in
9 mini-sections although she could have registered in up to 11 mini-sections due to her credit limit
￿t h e s e9a r eh e r1 st,2 nd,2 nd,7 th,9 th,1 2 th,1 2 th,1 4 th, and 14th ranked mini-sections. The two
unregistered slots in her maximal possible schedule are counted as if she were registered in her 18th
choice, remaining unmatched. Note that not accounting for unregistered slots, i.e., slots below
21credit limit, would needlessly favor a system where slots were left vacant. Thus, the mean rank of
this schedule is calculated as
( 1+2+2+7+9+1 2+1 2+1 4+1 4+1 8+1 8 ) /11 = 9.91.
¥
Across all 489 students submitting a preference ranking, the average rank improvement by
using GS versus UMBS is 1.1053. Across the 123 students who submitted a submitted preference
ranking and were assigned diﬀerent schedules under GS vs. UMBS, the average rank improvement
is 4.3943.
An alternative method is comparing only the students who have the same credit load in the
two schedules (GS and UMBS) and not taking into account unmatched slots in students￿ schedules.
Across the 456 students who have the same credit load in the two schedules (and who submitted a
preference ranking), the average rank improvement by using GS versus UMBS is 1.0647. Across
the 90 students who submitted a preference ranking and were assigned diﬀerent schedules under
GS vs. UMBS with the same credit load, the average rank improvement is 5.3944.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we draw attention to bid-based course allocation systems used in universities. S￿nmez
and ￿nver (2003) theoretically show that bid-based allocation systems currently in use can result
in allocations that are not market outcomes and result in unnecessary loss of eﬃciency. They
propose an alternate course allocation mechanism which they show results in the Pareto-dominant
market outcome. We use a controlled ￿eld experiment to test the extent of the eﬃciency loss
created by the UMBS mechanism with respect to the best market mechanism, the one proposed by
22S￿nmez and ￿nver. We believe that the ￿eld test carried out at UMBS shows quite clearly that the
UMBS mechanism results in signi￿cant eﬃciency loss due to the two possibly con￿icting roles of
the student bids. The Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market mechanism has the potential to make
a substantially larger proportion of students better oﬀ (approximately 20% in our study) than the
UMBS mechanism which is currently in place at many schools. Thus, schools should consider
adoption of the Gale-Shapley mechanism, given that the change required is relatively minor and
the potential bene￿ts are quite large.
We should mention that during the add-drop period in the UMBS system, some of the students
would be able to transfer from a less preferred course that they bid high points on and got into, to a
more preferred course that they bid less on and did not get assigned. However, sometimes this will
not be possible, since this more preferred course will be already ￿lled during the course allocation.
Moreover, when it is possible, unnecessary add-drop creates a lot of upheaval in the registrar￿s
oﬃce and even worse is the fact that the class takes longer to get settled, reducing the quality
of education in the early weeks of the semester. Perhaps, it is due to the ineﬃcient allocation
process that UMBS allows two full weeks for add-drop in a mini-semester that is only 7 weeks long.
Clearly, this needs to be changed.
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8A p p e n d i c e s
A Variants of Course Allocation Mechanisms
A.1 Some Variants of UMBS Course-Bidding Mechanism
Yale School of Management:
Uses the same mechanism as the University of Michigan Business School except that students
c a no n l yb i df o ro n l y￿ve courses (and the normal course load is four courses).
Columbia Business School:
￿ The real-life version of UMBS course-bidding mechanism is used for two rounds.
￿ The ￿rst round is the ￿main￿ round whereas in Round 2 students are expected to ￿ll the gaps
in their ￿rst round schedule.
￿ Unsuccessful bids from Round 1 are returned to students to be used in Round 2.
￿ Students can only bid for undersubscribed courses in Round 2.
Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley:
27Uses the same two-round version as the Columbia Business School except that students cannot
bid for more than a ￿xed number of units.
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University:
￿ The bid endowment should be used over two quarters by ￿rst year MBA students and over
three quarters by second year MBA students. Points not used in ￿rst year do not carry over
to the second year.
￿ Each quarter there are two rounds of bidding similar to the bidding at Columbia Business
School, except that
￿ students can bid for at most ￿ve courses (where the normal course load is four courses),
￿ students are charged for the market clearing bids, not their own bids, and
￿ bids from the second rounds carry over to the next quarter unless bidding is for the last
quarter of the year.
￿ Hence bidding for the second quarter of the ￿rst year and the third quarter of the second
year is analogous to course bidding at Columbia and Haas.
Princeton University:
￿ Undergraduate students cluster alternate courses together and strictly rank the courses within
each cluster. Students will be assigned no more than one course from each cluster.
￿ Students allocate their bid endowment over clusters (as opposed to individual courses). The
bid for each course in a cluster is equated to the bid for the cluster. Based on these bids,
course allocation is implemented via a variant of UMBS course-bidding mechanism where
28￿ the bids of a student for courses in a cluster are ordered subsequently based on the
ranking within the cluster, and
￿ once a bid of a student is successful for a course in a cluster, her bids for all lower ranked
courses in the same cluster are dropped.
A.2 Examples of Preference-based Course Allocation Mechanisms
Harvard Business School Course Allocation Mechanism (also adopted in Stanford
Graduate School of Business):
￿ Students are strictly ordered in a single priority list with a random lottery.
￿ Each student submits a preference ranking of the courses.
￿ The assignment of the ￿rst course seat for each student is obtained with the serial dictatorship
that is induced by the priority ordering of students: The ￿rst student is assigned a seat at
her top choice, the next student is assigned a seat at her top choice among classes with still
available seats, and so on.
￿ Once the assignment of the ￿rst seats are ￿nalized (or equivalently the ￿rst cycle is completed),
the assignment of second course seats are determined in a similar way using the reverse priority
order, next the third course seats are determined in a similar way using the initial priority
order, and so on.
29B An Example When Students are Expected Utility Maximizers
and Price-Takers
Example: (S￿nmez and ￿nver 2003) Consider a student i who shall register up to qI =5courses
and suppose there are six courses. Her utility for each individual course is given in the following
table
Course c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
Utility 150 100 100 100 100 100
and her utility for a schedule s, consisting of no more than 5 courses, is additively-separable
Ui(s)=Σc∈sUi(c).
Student i has a total of B = 1001 points to bid over courses c1 − c6 and the minimum acceptable
bid is 1. Based on previous years￿ bid-data, student i has the following belief on the market clearing
bids:
￿ Market clearing bid for course c1 will be 0 with probability 1.
￿ Market clearing bids for the courses in c2−c6 have independent identical cumulative distribu-
tion functions and for any of these courses c,t h ec d fFi
c is strictly concave with Fi
c(200) = 0.7,
Fi
c(250) = 0.8,a n dFi
c(1001) = 1. That is, for each of the courses c2 − c6, student i believes
that the market-clearing bid will be no more than 200 with 70% probability and no more
than 250 with 80% probability.
Assuming that she is an expected utility maximizer, we next ￿nd the optimal bid-vector for
student i:B y￿rst order necessary conditions and symmetry, student i
￿ shall bid 1 for course c1,a n d
30￿ the same value for each course c ∈ {c2,c 3,c 4,c 5,c 6} for which she devotes a positive bid.
Therefore the optimal bid-vector is in the form: bic1 =1 , bic = 1000/k for any k of courses
c2 − c6. We next derive the expected utility of each such possibility.
Case 1: b1






u1 =P r {pc2 ≤ 200,p c3 ≤ 200,p c4 ≤ 200,p c5 ≤ 200,p c6 ≤ 200}￿Ui({c2,c 3,c 4,c 5,c 6})
+5P r{pc2 > 200,p c3 ≤ 200,p c4 ≤ 200,p c5 ≤ 200,p c6 ≤ 200}￿Ui({c1,c 3,c 4,c 5,c 6})
+1 0P r {pc2 > 200,p c3 > 200,p c4 ≤ 200,p c5 ≤ 200,p c6 ≤ 200}￿Ui({c1,c 4,c 5,c 6})
+1 0P r {pc2 > 200,p c3 > 200,p c4 > 200,p c5 ≤ 200,p c6 ≤ 200}￿Ui({c1,c 5,c 6})
+5P r {pc2 > 200,p c3 > 200,p c4 > 200,p c5 > 200,p c6 ≤ 200}￿Ui({c1,c 6})
+P r {pc2 > 200,p c3 > 200,p c4 > 200,p c5 > 200,p c6 > 200}￿Ui({c1})
=0 .75 ￿ 500 + 5 ￿ 0.74(1 − 0.7) ￿ 550 + 10 ￿ 0.73(1 − 0.7)2 ￿ 450
+1 0￿ 0.72(1 − 0.7)3 ￿ 350 + 5 ￿ 0.7(1 − 0.7)4 ￿ 250 + (1 − 0.7)5 ￿ 150 = 474.79
Case 2: b2




ic5 = 250, b2
ic6 =0 .
u2 =P r {pc2 ≤ 250,p c3 ≤ 250,p c4 ≤ 250,p c5 ≤ 250}￿Ui({c1,c 2,c 3,c 4,c 5})
+4P r{pc2 > 250,p c3 ≤ 250,p c4 ≤ 250,p c5 ≤ 250}￿Ui({c1,c 3,c 4,c 5})
+6P r{pc2 > 250,p c3 > 250,p c4 ≤ 250,p c5 ≤ 250}￿Ui({c1,c 4,c 5})
+4P r{pc2 > 250,p c3 > 250,p c4 > 250,p c5 ≤ 250}￿Ui({c1,c 5})
+P r{pc2 > 250,p c3 > 250,p c4 > 250,p c5 > 250}￿Ui({c1})
=0 .84 ￿ 550 + 4 ￿ 0.83 ￿ (1 − 0.8) ￿ 450 + 6 ￿ 0.82 ￿ (1 − 0.8)2 ￿ 350
+4￿ 0.8 ￿ (1 − 0.8)3 ￿ 250 + (1 − 0.8)
4 ￿ 150 = 470.0
31Since expected utility of bidding for three or less of courses c2−c6 can be no more than 150+3￿100 =
450, the optimal bid vector for student i is b1
i with an expected utility of 474.79.T h e r e a r e t w o
important observations we shall make. The ￿rst one is an obvious one: The optimal bid for
the most deserved course c1 is the smallest bid violating bid-monotonicity. The second point is
less obvious but more important: Under the optimal bid b1
i, student i is assigned the schedule
s = {c2,c 3,c 4,c 5,c 6} with probability 0.75 =0 .168. So although the bid b1
ic1 =1is high enough to
claim a seat at course c1, since it is the lowest bid, student i is not assigned a seat in an available
course under UMBS course-bidding mechanism. Therefore the outcome of UMBS course-bidding
mechanism cannot be supported as a market outcome and this weakness is a direct source of
eﬃciency loss. To summarize:
1. how much a student bids for a course under UMBS course-bidding mechanism is not neces-
sarily a good indication of how much a student wants that course,
2. as an implication the outcome of UMBS course-bidding mechanism cannot always be sup-
ported as a market outcome, and
3. UMBS course-bidding mechanism may result in unnecessary eﬃciency loss due to not seeking
direct information on student preferences. ¥
32